Barcelona Metropolis

What started happening in 2017?

On 17 August 2017, there was a serious terrorist attack on the Rambla in Barcelona. Although the post-attack response by the police, medics, firefighters and general public could be described as very good, it is no less true that the subsequent reinforcement of particularly sensitive points obliges the police, especially the Mossos d’Esquadra police force, with the support of the Guàrdia Urbana police force, to undertake a series of protection and self-protection operations and to strengthen strategic surveillance sites. This still accounts for a significant increase in police work in Barcelona and throughout Catalonia, even today.

Furthermore, the events of 1 October 2017 and the central government’s application of Article 155 of the Constitution created a situation with major consequences for security and the police. In one year, the Catalan Ministry of the Interior witnessed the change of three ministers, a temporary manager for implementing Article 155, three general managers and three heads of the body, as well as procedures against much of the top brass of the Mossos d’Esquadra. The purge of the senior officials of the Catalan Ministry of the Interior and the Mossos d’Esquadra left the regional police force leaderless for many months, during which time the Guàrdia Urbana city police force of Barcelona had to redouble its efforts to provide an adequate presence on the street.

The extraordinary rise in demonstrations and gatherings resulting from these events have forced changes in all police services to date. Both the Mossos, dealing with public order, and the Guàrdia Urbana, faced with blocked roads and detours, have allocated many officers to the protection of each event. Moreover, if the demonstrations or gatherings are not announced, some services planned to deal with such contingencies must be taken apart.

To this situation, we must add two aggravating factors. The first is the impossibility of hiring more police officers, as staff levels are affected by state contingent budget laws, which provide just enough to fill the vacancies that occur due to sickness, injury and retirement (the substitution of officers had to be alleviated through extra hours, to the extent possible, costing millions of euros). The second factor is the uncertainty caused by the government with its decree of local police retirement starting at age 60. Despite being positive, the measure was managed behind the backs of the city councils, with invalid information and without planning for the retired officers to be gradually replaced. It was not properly calculated that the period necessary for selecting and training new officers is almost a year and a half, creating significant gaps between policemen’s exit and entry.

No magic solutions

If we have raised a plausible explanatory framework here, the problem of insecurity could lead to two conclusions. The first is that it would not be peculiar just to Barcelona, but to all of Catalonia. The second is that it is not comparable to other cities or parts of the country, since they did not suffer from the application of Article 155 and have not experienced comparable socio-economic development (tourism, gentrification, urban speculation, etc.). Regarding the extension of the phenomenon, theft and crimes against cultural property have grown, to a greater or lesser extent, across Catalonia.

There are no magical solutions or miracle cures to deal with this situation, and there is no silver bullet, but we must still do something serious and enduring. First, and this is essential to understand, we must accurately identify and measure the problem, its causes and its scope, in order to tackle it from a complex and multifactorial perspective.

Second, we must design specific public security policies that are clear and understandable and foster people’s participation and engagement. This will not be effective without the institutions and the people’s joint effort and involvement in understanding the problem and in searching for specific solutions adapted to the area. Every public policy must be led by the public authorities and have real concreteness, close to the people. The implementation of policies of engagement and transparency and responses such as the district police in Barcelona are all efforts to further this line of action.

Third, nothing will be possible without close and loyal cooperation between public institutions that does not rule out the involvement of private security agencies. This effort must be led via public services and view all residents (not just the voters for each choice) as recipients/beneficiaries of security policies. In this regard, the efforts exerted by Barcelona City Council towards effective institutional cooperation between City Hall and the Government of Catalonia have led to the launch of a shock plan for Ciutat Vella and joint operations with other sectors, such as Renfe and TMB, which are giving positive results but require reliability and continuity.

Fourth, we must demand solutions to the impunity stemming from the criminal justice system’s inadequate response, which discourages the people and the police forces.

In organisational terms, we must improve how the police forces operate, helping them to adapt to the social changes in their environment, take advantage of human and material resources more efficiently and increase recruitment reasonably and justifiably. The implementation of the Master Plan of the Guàrdia Urbana of Barcelona, with its restructuring and suggestions for improvement, is a step in this direction. And training is fundamental.

These measures offer possible and necessary solutions and their impetus is beginning to reverse the effects of the undesirable situation in 2017. Now we have to watch to make sure it stays reversed, and above all, to not let it happen again.