Democracy: A triple fracture

Illustration ©Octavi Serra

The far right does not hold a monopoly on attacks against democracy. In fact, this phenomenon arises in a context of multiple fractures, centred around the spectre of pure national identities. Political controversies that have been recast as moral issues, as seen in the United States, and nativism, which fuels an exclusionary identity narrative, together shape a landscape that endangers the values of coexistence.

We are living through a crisis in our democracies. We are concerned about the future: will the principles to which democrats cling be able to endure? Far-right populism is spreading across Europe, casting an ever-growing shadow that is seen as the greatest threat to the future of democracy. Yet, while this is true, it is only part of the story, as the far right does not have a monopoly on attacks against democracy.

To better grasp the full extent of the danger, I want to explore what I believe is a triple fracture within democracy. The first stems from the transformation of liberal principles into identity totems. The second involves the moral polarisation of political debates. And the third is the arbitrary and anti-liberal redefinition of the common good. These three dynamics are cumulative and feed off one another.

Democracy in crisis

For a long time, we have lived in societies that believed the future would become increasingly democratic. But because democracy often felt like an imperfect reality – never inclusive enough, always too unequal – we thought we could improve it, strengthen it and finally bring it to fruition. We did everything possible to keep this hope alive, a hope that, while never fully realised, gave meaning and strength to our shared sense of citizenship.

Today, however, this vision of the future is no longer an unquestionable guide. In many countries, it has been replaced by a political nostalgia for a past that never truly existed. This has fuelled the illusion that the cultural purity of the nation must be restored. In the name of this restoration, the countries that were the great cradles of modern democracy in the late 18th century are now tempted to abandon them.

In the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, voices are emerging that reject the principles that for two centuries have been considered essential to any democracy: equality, inclusion, solidarity, emancipation, diversity and the right to difference. This backlash is now shaking the foundations of democracy, along with its principles and values, in the very places where it first took root.

Who could have imagined just ten years ago that the Republican Party, a key player in American democracy, would come to see Donald Trump as its figurehead and make the slogan “Make America Great Again” its sole agenda? Similarly, it was on the same ideological ground that the British voted for Brexit, following a referendum that magnified national identity and immigration. Just hours before the vote count, few believed that the United Kingdom could actually leave the European Union.

And what can we say about the Netherlands? Does the Dutch political tradition still champion tolerance as a cornerstone of national identity? The memory of Spinoza, the great philosopher whose converso Jewish family found refuge in the country from the Iberian Inquisition, still endures. Yet today, the Dutch government is co-led by a party, the PVV, whose leader has called for a ban on the Quran.

Lastly, who would have imagined that the debate in France would come to regard anti-racism as a more problematic issue than racism itself, ultimately turning the meaning of the motto “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” on its head in a quixotic battle against wokeism?

The culturalisation of citizenship

These examples reveal three dynamics that characterise the contemporary crisis of democracy. The first of these dynamics is that the values typical of liberal citizenship have been transformed into values of cultural uniqueness. A particularly telling example of this culturalisation of citizenship is found in France, where secularism has been a core principle of French democracy since 1905, alongside freedoms such as trade union rights, freedom of the press and even free compulsory education.

The 1905 law on secularism provides a framework of freedom and equality with respect to religious diversity. It establishes a separation between the State and religions: the State must not interfere in religious matters. The goal is to guarantee religious freedom for everyone, recognising it as a fundamental right. Moreover, the law asserts the equality of all religions, meaning no religion is privileged over another. As a result, individuals are free to believe or not believe, and to practise their religion freely, without fear of state interference or domination by another cultural or religious group.

At present, however, the debate on secularism in France is no longer framed in these terms. Secularism has turned into a discussion about national identity, opposing the presence of people of the Muslim faith, even though they have been there for a long time. It has ceased to be a question of state neutrality, religious freedom or equality between religions.

Aside from the omnipresent media and political discourses, this new conception of secularism has very clear-cut effects. For instance, during naturalisation interviews for French citizenship, an official might ask a woman wearing a headscarf to remove it to assess her “compatibility” with “French culture”. Another example: in 2023, a Muslim school nearly lost its state contract due to suspicions based on classroom statements considered incompatible with the “values” of the French Republic. Meanwhile, no sanctions were imposed when it was revealed that a prestigious Catholic school in Paris had courses on sexuality that stigmatised homosexuality and promoted “conversion therapies” for LGBTQ+ students.

Another example: in the Netherlands, in 2020, several very strict Protestant schools required students’ families to sign a contract stating that they lived according to the “precepts of the Bible”, which explicitly included a rejection of homosexuality. This attack on LGBTQ+ rights sparked significant public outrage. In response to the scandal, the principle of one of the schools expressed surprise, claiming that sexual equality was an issue only for Muslims, as Protestants were seen as the core of Dutch identity and thus unaffected by debates over “typically Dutch values”.[1]

Political disagreements are moving into the realm of morality

A second fracture in liberal democracy is the extreme polarisation of political debate. It’s as if there are two separate societies within the same country that can no longer communicate with each other. This divide is perpetuated by the way the media handle highly divisive issues like immigration and Islam.

Comparing this with the situation in the United States illustrates the harmful effects of such polarisation. In 2023, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s annual Democracy Index ranked the United States 29th among the world’s democracies, far from the top ten, which are occupied by Scandinavian countries.[2]

The rankings are only slightly better for France (23rd) and the United Kingdom (20th). In all three countries, the report highlights a concerning erosion of their “political culture,” which refers to the strength of existing agreements needed to uphold democratic principles.

In its 2020 report, the EIU pointed out that in the United States, “supporters of Biden and Trump see the differences between them as being about ‘core American values’ and not just about politics and policies. As a result of this deepening divide over values, political culture has become the weakest category for the US […]. As Americans increasingly occupy two distinct and conflicting realities, prospects for a short-term improvement in this score seem to be dwindling”.[3]

The authors themselves stated: “More worrying, public trust in the democratic process was dealt a further blow in 2020 by the refusal of the outgoing president to accept the election result. Mr Trump and his allies continued to allege voter fraud long after the election was over, without producing reasonable evidence to substantiate their claims […]. The consequence of the long-running culture wars in the US and the heightened political polarisation of recent years is that social cohesion has collapsed and consensus has evaporated on fundamental issues, such as election outcomes, public health practices and even the date of the country’s founding”.[4]

The worrying polarisation of political and public debate in liberal democracies is leading to a breakdown in the usual ways of resolving disagreements. Freedom of expression is being directly challenged and social cohesion is being eroded. Confronted with a type of monolithic thinking, it is no longer possible to engage in debate based on our disagreements regarding the decisions we must make as a society. Politics has moved into the realm of morality.

Nativism: A fracture in citizenship

We are being urged to pick a side. This is, for instance, why a term like “wokeism”, which emerged from far-right circles in the United States, has recently taken centre stage in France’s debates about “French identity”. Wokeism isn’t an analytical concept and does not describe any empirical reality, but it serves as a powerful slogan to discredit any reasoned critique of social inequalities.

In the name of combating wokeism, there is justification for sidelining the agenda of social justice and equity when it comes to sexual, ethnic or religious minorities. With this single argument, democratic reasoning is swept aside in favour of an exclusionary identity-driven discourse. This is exactly what gives weight to the idea of a so-called “tyranny of minorities”, allowing demands for greater social justice from the most vulnerable groups in society to be cast as illegitimate claims that weaken the national fabric. This aligns with John Higham’s classic definition of nativism, which he described as an ideology that justifies “opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign connections”.[5]

But this is precisely what the modern democratic tradition has always sought to prevent. The founders of political liberalism envisioned that in a democratic society, the majority’s expression should protect the “minorities” from what Tocqueville termed the “tyranny of the majority”.

Nativism sharply departs from this idea; in fact, it reverses it: “true” racism is now seen as targeting the national majority rather than immigrant minorities. Traditional anti-racism is no longer viewed as an essential aspect of democracy but as a threat to the nation’s cultural integrity that needs to be defended.

To justify this reversal, nativist ideology questions the “true” identity of certain citizens, either by deeming them as having arrived too recently or viewing them as incompatible with the national political culture. Despite having been citizens for several generations, these individuals are labelled as foreigners in their own country.

Only those arbitrarily designated as “natives” are recognised as true members of society. In this framework, citizenship becomes an exclusive, hierarchical status based on length of residence and origins, which is the complete opposite of democratic belonging.

Conclusion

These three fractures represent a much broader and more complex problem than the rise of the far right alone. Nativist rhetoric is not only managing to impose its narrative on social justice issues related to class, race and religion within the dominant political discourse, but they are also turning political liberalism against itself.

Nativists are explicitly leveraging progressive ideals such as secularism, sexual liberation and gender equality to their advantage. The principles of emancipation and tolerance, which were once seen as remedies for the crisis in liberal democracies, no longer serve this purpose on their own. Instead, these ideals are being used as tools of exclusion that deepen the divisions within our societies. Therefore, it is crucial to deconstruct these nativist discourses to better understand them and to promote a vision of society that remains true to democratic ideals. This requires constant vigilance, moments of insight and a sense of civic responsibility.


[1] Bertossi, C., Duyvendak, J. W. and Taché, A. Nativisme. Ceux qui sont nés quelque part… et qui veulent en exclure les autres [Nativism. Those Who Were Born Somewhere… and Who Want to Exclude Others]. Les petits matins, Paris, 2021.

[2] The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index: In Sickness and In Health, 47. EIU, London, 2024.

[3] The Economist Intelligence Unit. Democracy Index: Age of Conflict, 44. EIU, London, 2020.

[4] Ibíd., 46-47.

[5] Higham, J. Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1955.

Duyvendak, J. W. and Kesic, J. The Return of the Native: Can Liberalism Safeguard Us Against Nativism? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019.

RECOMMENDED READING

  • Les mots et les choses de l’immigration en France Éditions du Trocadéro, 2022 
  • Nativisme. Ceux qui sont nés quelque part… et veulent en exclure les autresChristophe Bertossi, Aurélien Taché and Jan Willem Duyvendak / Les Petits Matins, 2021
  • La citoyenneté à la française CNRS, 2016 

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